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Da Cohen a Berlusconi, passando per Rawls e il calcio
Uno dei meriti delle critiche mosse da G.A. Cohen alla teoria di Rawls è sicuramente il fatto di avere provocato, per reazione, una rinascita dell’interesse da parte della “scuola Rawlsiana” nei confronti della cosidetta “pubblicità” della giustizia (si veda ad esempio A. Williams Incenvites, Inequality, and Publicity, di cui trovate una copia “piratata” nel box sul lato destro).
L’aspetto della pubblicità a cui mi riferisco riguarda, potremmo dire, la visibilità della giustizia, non la sua giustificazione. La questione della visibilità della giustizia ha a che vedere con il fatto che l’oggetto della giustizia sia un sistema pubblico di regole. Le regole devono essere tali che non sia troppo difficile per le parti interessate trovarsi d’accordosul fatto che le regole siano state o meno rispettate. E’ una pretesa intuitiva se si concepisce la società politica come il frutto di attività basate su regole condivise. In qualsiasi gioco o altra attività basata su regole, è’ evidente che sia auspicabile che tale pretesa sia soddisfatta. I giochi non riescono bene se le regole sono tali che l’esecuzione del gioco risulta compromessa dal dubbio che le regole siano generalmente rispettate, in quanto ciascun giocatore non è in grado di stabilire se altri le rispettino.
Mentre scrivevo questo paragrafo del libro a cui sto lavorando, mi veniva in mente la terribile analogia tra il modo in cui il gioco della giustizia e il gioco del calcio vengono vissuti in Italia, o, per dirlo altrimenti, all’analogia tra il processo di Biscardi e il dibattito pubblico sui processi che riguardano il nostro premier. In entrambi i casi in questione si tratta di un gioco che non funziona, perché per le parti interessate sembra così difficile mettersi d’accordo sul fatto che le regole siano state o meno rispettate.
Viene da pensare che il fallimento della pubblicità in questi casi non abbia a che fare più di tanto con la natura delle regole (dopotutto il calcio viene giocato con le stesse regole più o meno in tutto il mondo) ma con un fattore caratterizzante di tipo antropologico-culturale. Solo che a pensarla così si finisce per diventare razzisti verso il proprio paese, cioè verso sé stessi…
Per una conclusione più filosofica… viene da pensare che la pubblicità non sia un requisito assoluto, ma relativo. Infatti anche Rawls pretende che la pubblicità sia tale per parti in gioco “ragionevoli”. Quindi la teoria di Rawls non può essere applicata all’Italia?
Google translation of the previous post
This is the google translation of my previous post. (In brackets, required corrections)
” Starts google translation
What is wrong in this topic [argument]?
March 18, 2010 · Leave a Comment
Preconditions
[a] to E ‘right to reduce the inequalities caused by morally arbitrary factors (non-arbitrariness)
b if inequality is permitted by a principle that expresses an adequate conception of reciprocity, then it is just (reciprocity weak).
c. The difference principle expresses a proper conception of reciprocity (at least when applied to income inequality, wealth and authority consistent fair equality of opportunity).
Premise (c) is the position you on the difference principle Rawls (A Theory of Justice, 2nd ed. P. 88, trans.. P. 112).
The argument is as follows:
Topic:
1. Inequalities in income, wealth and authority among families of the generation 1 compatible with fair equality of opportunity and the principle of difference (D1) are just (to BEC) [from (b) and (c)]
2. Since D1 inequalities are just (1), they are not arbitrary from the moral point of view
3. D1 inequalities between families of the generation 1 correspond to different social circumstances of origin of the children of the generation 1 (which we call Generation 2)
4. Inequalities of opportunity (D2) between the individuals of generation 2, due to different social circumstances of origin do not result from arbitrary inequalities in terms of morality (from 2 and 3)
5. It’s not fair to remove the inequality (D2) as due to morally arbitrary factors (from ae 4 [from a and 4])
6. Fair equality of inequality of opportunity should be excluded due to different social circumstances of origin [Fair equality of opportunity excludes inequalities due to different social circumstances of origin]
7. The role of fair equality of opportunity, from the standpoint of justice, can not be to reduce inequalities unjust as it is morally arbitrary (from 5 and 6) [Almost correct, but still understandable?]
But then, what is the purpose of fair equality of opportunity? (Note that this issue creates problems dualistic interpretation of justice as fairness.)
I found that the argument is invalid (even though I disagree with the conclusion for different reasons). Do you agree? If so, do you where is the error?
END of translation”
The translation quality (nOt the argument) is IMPRESSIVE, isn’t it?
Due interpretazioni dell’eguaglianza democratica
A ben vedere, sono possibili due interpretazioni alternative delle ragioni alla base dell’interpretazione del secondo principio come eguaglianza democratica. Secondo la prima interpretazione, alla base del secondo principio di giustizia vi sarebbero due concezioni fondamentalmente diverse di ciò che rende le diseguaglianze giustificate:
1. la non dipendenza da fattori moralmente arbitrari
2. la reciprocità, cioè il vantaggio per entrambe le parti interessate alla spartizione del prodotto comune, rispetto a una posizione iniziale di eguaglianza.
Secondo la seconda interpretazione, l’unico principio che giustifica è quello della reciprocità. In base a tale interpretazione la riduzione del peso dei fattori moralmente arbitrari (sebbene auspicabile dal punto di vista del principio di riparazione) non sarebbe altro che un effetto collaterale di strutture sociali che sono tenute a soddisfare vincoli morali di tipo essenzialmente diverso.
E voi, per quale interpretazione propendete?
Esistono ancora i filosofi
Posted in Uncategorized
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L’origine della vita complessa
Un giorno, un batterio entra dentro un altro batterio e nasce la vita complessa.
on reformulating equality of opportunity
I want to come back on a problem that I had already confronted in a previous post.
As I pointed out there, social barriers to access germ-line engineering appear to be outside the scope of the Rawls’ Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle (from now on FEO), at least in the formulation Rawls gives. This is, shortly, because the principle does not require equality of opportunity for people with different talents. ( “Fair” equality of opportunity is really inequality of opportunity, operationally defined). In other words FEO aims to abolish social barriers against the use of a person’s fully realized talent (careers open to talents), the cultivation and expression of talent potential/natural ability (through wide educational opportunities), but social barriers in the access to germ-line enhancements are not social barriers against the use of realized talent or the cultivation of talent-potential, they are social barriers to factors that pre-exist the ascription of talent-potential to one individual .
As I explain in this post this formulation leads to a bunch of counterintuitive consequences, since it would allow a sort of “genetic aristocracy” to exist without apparent violation of FEO. To avoid that implication, it seems, socially manipulable biological factors affecting talent-potential should not be considered “natural”, even if they are biological.
It is unclear how FEO should be formulated – as to make clear that biological factors affecting talent potential should not be considered “natural” when they are subject to “social manipulation”. One possibility would be to stipulate that “natural talents” in the Rawlsian explanation of FEO only refers to “that portion of the determinants of a person’s talent that is not subject to manipulation”. This would exclude “genetically enhanced” (or engineered) abilities and disposition from a person’s asset of “natural talent” (with respect to FEO), but it would not work with another kind of “social manipulation” that closely resembles genetic enhancement in its social and moral consequences, but that does not count (at least, arguably) as a “manipulation” of a person’s biological (genetic, or otherwise) endowment: the selection of embryos and gametes with “desired” and “favorable” characteristics. (For by selecting embryos or gamates one is not changing (“manipulating”) biological matter; it is only deciding which among several possible configurations of biological matter to allow to exist.) The point I am making is that exclusive access to screening technology would also confer the families of the wealthy unfair advantage over the families of the poor as the richest would be able to have children with advantageous characteristics (say – children requiring less economic and human resources for achieving the same educational results).
For this reason, in this post, I suggested that “natural talents” in the context of Rawls’ FEO should be understood as those characteristics which do not “[result] in a systematic and predictable manner from intentional human acts or from the working of human institutions”. The problem with this solution, however, is that many human characteristics that we normally consider talents result from the intentional actions of parents in a quite systematic and predictable fashion. For instance, a man who marries a very talented musician and decides to have a child with her certainly acts intentionally (by so doing) and can predict that her child will have higher than normal chances of being musically talented. A woman who marries a very handsome man and decides to have a child with him also certainly acts intentionally and can foresee some good chances that her child will be more than average handsome. The difference between such decision and the decision to use biological information to select gametes (or embryos) with “advantageous” genes is, at most, a matter of degree, rather than a qualitative gap. (Of course, I’m deliberately leaving aside questions on the moral status of embryos; if that is believed to imply disanalogies with respect to justice, the same questions can be framed in terms ofthe selection of gametes.)
Hence, if we decide that “natural talent” should be understood (in the context of RAwls’ FEO) as “a talent which does not result in a systematic and predictable manner from intentional human acts or from the working of human institutions” we end up denying the existence of natural talents (at least, among characteristics affecting access to offices and careers) and FEO becomes an empty principle.
For this reason, reflection suggests leaving FEO as it is and adding a further clause for dealing with genetic enhancements:
“In all sectors of society there should be rougly equal prospects to improve the inheritable genetic determinants of the “all-purpose-talents” or “natural primary goods” of one’s child.”
This principle, I believe, closely resembles FEO in meaning and function. It does not imply that society ougth to aim at the equalization (or more broadly, some form of patterned distribution) of the inheritable biological bases of talent (e.g. certain human genes), the sort of result that those embracing luck-egalitarian intuitions should embrace. But it is not also wholly indifferent with respect to the way in which social factors – in particular wealth and social standing – affect the distribution of “genes”. And its inclusion in a theory of justice would allow us to object in a principled manner to the distribution of “genes” that would lead to a genetic aristocracy.
Posted in Genetics and justice, Uncategorized
Tagged bioethics, enhancement, equality, ethics of genetics, opportunity, Rawls